Naturalization under the 1950 Nationality Law

Closing the gap between social and national experience and identity

By William Wetherall

First posted 16 March 2006
Last updated 3 July 2013

Naturalization in Japan, 1950-2013 • Terminology 1950 Nationality Law | | |
Table 1: Naturalization in Japan, 1950-2013  The demographics of interest in becoming Japanese
Table 2: Family ties of naturalizers in Japan, 1952-1962  Nationality unification mixed-nationality families

Naturalization in Japan, 1950-2013

This article constitutes an overview of naturalization trends in Japan following the enforcement of the 1950 Nationality Law. Appended at the end are two tables. One shows naturalization and related statistics in Japan from 1950 to date by nationality. The other shows breakdowns of naturalization figures for 1952-1962 by former or present ties to a "Japanese" person defined as a member of a prefectural family register.

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Terminology

The Ministry of Justice has reported the number of applicants who have been approved each year in three groups: Chosen (Korea) or Kankoku/Chosen (Korea), Chugoku (China), and Others.

For definitions of and commentary on these and other alien alliliations, see "Kankoku/Chosen" and "Chugoku".

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Terminology

Naturalization in 1899 and 1950 laws

Naturalization as a legal process in Japan's nationality law has been possible since 1899, when the country's first Nationality Law was promulgated. Since 1873, it was possibile for aliens to became Japanese through permission -- granted the head of a register-defined household affiliated with Japan's sovereign territory -- to enter the household as a husband, wife, or child of a member of the family. Before this, national affiliation was not defined as such, but to the extent one was considered affiliated with "Japan" as territory, affilation -- as it remains today -- was essentially a matter of being registered as a member of a local household.

See Becoming Japanese in the Meiji period and Allegiance change in Yamato for more about practices before the introduction of "naturalization" in 1899.

Anti-subversive provision in 1950 law

Naturalization rules in the 1899 Nationality Law remain largely the same in the present 1950 Nationality Law. The rules generally compare to rules in most other countries.

The most notable change in 1950 was a provision that allowed the Minister of Justice to refuse to permit naturalization on grounds of subversive beliefs or acts (Article 4 in 1950 laws as enacted, Article 5 in 1985 and later revisions). This inclusion of this provision codified concerns about the spread of revolutionary communism during the years immediately after World War II, but it also reflected Japan's prewar and war-time attitudes toward the sort of anti-state socialism and communism that had been spreading in greater East Asia, and in Japan, during the first half of the 19th century.

The anti-subversive constraint in the 1950 naturalization rules probably had little effect on dampening enthusiasim for naturalization. Japan's largest status minorities in Japan at the time were Koreans whose status under Japanese law was that of a Japanese national treated as an alien for certain purposes. These Koreans, along with Formosans, lost their Japanese nationality from 28 April 1952, when Korea (Chosen) and Formosa (Taiwan) were fully separated from Japan by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which came into effect on this day.

Over 95 percent of the roughly 600,000 or so Koreans in Japan at the time had register addresses south of the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula, within the territory that was under the control of the Republic of Korea (ROK), which claimed the entire peninsula. Fewer than 5 percent had addresses north of the 38th parallel, under the control of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), a communist state.

Yet it appeared to some Japanese government and GHQ/SCAP officials in Occupied Japan that about half of all Koreans in Japan supported Kim Il Sung, or were otherwise aligned with DPRK. However, not all Koreans in Japan were divided by the 38th parallel, and among those who nominally supported either ROK or DPRK, the quality of their support not uniform.

Koreans in Japan included children too young to have political beliefs, adults interested only in a unified Korea or in the well-being of relatives on the peninsula, and adults concerned only about their life in Japan. Even the more zealous supporters of Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee were likely to be ambivalent when it came to where they would choose to live in the real world, as opposed to the utopias promised by ideologues.

In any event, when Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers in 1945, most adult Koreans, everywhere in the world, appear to have celebrated Korea's "liberation" from Japan. Most in Occupied Japan also seem to have relished in being declared along with Formosans and some others, by Occupation Authorities, to be "Non-Japanese" for repatriation and later other purposes. Most Koreans in Japan -- whether supporters of ROK or DPRK or "Korea" as a unified country or nothing -- also seem to have seen their formal loss of Japanese nationality in 1952 as a blessing, since they considered it as something which had been forced on them.

Which is not to say that some Koreans in Japan did not wish to have remained Japanese. Nor this to say that other Koreans were not anxious about their new status as aliens -- for their alien status was still linked, under Japanese law, with their affiliation with "Korea" meaning "Chosen" as a former Japanese territory. In other words, "Koreans" in Japan remained unliberated from the ideological division of the Korean peninsula and recognition politics.

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Terminology

Naturalization trends from 1952

There was some naturalization under both the 1899 and 1950 nationality laws during the Occupation of Japan, but not of Taiwanese or Koreans, who were not cateogrical aliens but Japanese nationals. Naturalization became possible only when they became aliens from 28 April 1952, from which time applications and permits steadily rise, though momentary peaks for numerous reasons.

Chinese

Practically all of the "Chinese" population in Japan as of 28 April 1952 were nationals of the Republic of China (ROC). About half had addresses in Taiwan, which had been part of Japan, and the others had addresses in the provinces then under the control of the People's Republic of China.

Significant changes are seen in Chinese naturalization related to the Japan's switch of recognition from ROC to PRC in 1972, as ROC nationality would no longer be recognized. This did not affect the alien statuses of residence of ROC nationals in Japan, but it would effect the legalities of personal nationality changes, as ROC would no longer have missions in Japan through which to process renunciations. Hence there was a rush of naturalization applications to Japan and renunciation of ROC nationality leading up to the Joint Communique PRC-Japan signed in Beijing on 29 September 1972, in which Japan recognized PRC instead of ROC.

Koreans

The number of Korean naturalizations also steady increased, slightly accelerating in the early 1990s, leveling off from 1995, then peaking in 2003, since which it has sharply fallen. The vicissitudes are due mostly to combinations of changes in two populations -- one the original population that remained in Occupied Japan after World War II and descendants -- the other the population of ROK nationals migrating to Japan from the late 1980s or so.

The out-marriage rate of Koreans in Japan -- defined as the percent of Koreans who marry non-Koreans of all Koreans who marry -- has been above 20 percent since 1964, 30 percent since 1972, 40 percent since 1980, 50 percent since 1984, 60 percent since 1987, 70 percent percent since 1990, then eased up to over 80 in 2001. after which it leveled off at around 82 or 83 percent.

The out-marriage rate defined as the percent of marriages in which one spouse spouse is non-Korean has exceeded 50 percent since 1974, 70 percent since 1985, and 90 percent since 2005.

From 1985, practically all children of Korean-Japanese marriages stood to be registered as Japanese. From this point, natural increase of the Korean population sharply falls, and aging takes its toll in death.

The Korean population begins to steadily drop after peaking in 1991. The population of ROK migrants, which had been increasing, continues to increase, but the increase is offset by the rapid fall of the postwar population.

Korean naturalization from 1952-1962

The percents of Koreans and Chinese born in Japan, Korean, Taiwan, and Mainland changed between 1959 and 1974 as follows.

Places of birth of Koreans and Chinese in Japan

        Koreans        Chinese
        Japan  Korea   Japan   Taiwan Mainland

1959    64.2   35.4     63.1   19.0   17.9 
1964    68.4   31.3     61.2   22.0   16.8 
1969    72.5   27.3     59.2   24.9   15.9 
1974    75.6   24.1     51.1   25.8   23.1 

Source: MOJ publications, my percents.
        See "Born in Japan" for full report.

In 2001, the out-marriage rate of Koreans in Japan passes the 80 percent mark.

Decline in Korean naturalization rates

The number of aliens permitted to naturalize from a Kankoku/Chosen alien status has sharply fallen since its peak in 2003.

2003	11,778 (peak) 
2004	11,031
2005	 9,689
2006	 8,531
2007	 8,546
2008	 7,412
2009	 7,637

The fall-off in Korean naturalizations also reflects the above population dynamics, but changes the conditions of the postwar population are probably the most significant. The vast majority of the postwar-defined Korean population are Special Permanent Residents. Koreans who came to Japan from the Republic of Korea, or elsewhere, do not qualify for this status., including (1) the rapid decline in the number of postwar Koreans in Japan, for whom naturalization requirements are most relaxed; and (2) the convergence of treatment of Special Permanent Residents ( in the reflecting a rapid decrease in the postwar population reflecting the fact that the postwar population has been dropping dating from the late 1980s the Today, Chinese nationals outnumber Korean nationals, but the Chinese national population is younger and not nearly as settled as the Korean populatio The population of Koreans who desire to naturalize appears to have rapidly decreased. Naturalizers from Kan/Cho status include both SPR Koreans and other Koreans. The natural increase of Kan/Cho Koreans dropped in 1985 and has been increasingly negative since 1993. The population of SPRs is rapidly aging,, and because most naturalizers are in their 20s and 30s (see Asakawa’s data below), I think that SPRs are now mostly older people who are determined to keep their Korean status. ROK migrants who have settled in greater numbers since the 1980s are probably more likely to become general permanent residents (which are still increasing among Kan/Cho Koreans). But the rate of migration from ROK also appears to be leveling off, hence the population of non-SPR Kan/Cho Koreans who will become qualified for either general perm res or for naturalization will also level off.

Koreans in Japan

Significant shifts are seen related to Japan's shift of recognition , appear to -- appear to be slightly more apt to naturalize than Koreans,

1960   Figures for naturalizations permitted, and applications, peak this year for all three categories -- Chosen, Chugoku, and Others. This is just a momentary peak in an otherwise generally rising rate of naturalization in all three categorires. The peak most likely reflects a combination of foward moving earlier postwar waves or "booms" in demographic events, such as (1) marriages between Japanese and aliens (alien spouse naturalizes), (2) births of children of married Japanese woman and alien fathers (children naturalize with father), and (3) marriages of and births of children to aliens (all members of family naturalize), and (4) coming of age of alien children (naturalizations of such aliens).

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Terminology

Trends

Though alien registration statistics begin from 1947, figures on naturalization begin from 1952. The reason for this gap has to do with a lack of clarity in the legal status of former imperial subjects in Japan whose family registers were in Taiwan (part of ROC since 1945) or Chosen (Korea, claimed by both ROK and DPRK since 1948).

Technically, the Empire of Japan lost Taiwan and Chosen as territories, and Karafuto as a prefecture, the moment it accepted the terms of surrender set down in the Potsdam Agreement of 26 July 1945 by United States (Harry S. Truman), Great Britain (Winston Churchill), and the Republic of China (Chiang Kai-Shek).

That states were seen as racial entities is clear in Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Agreement, which begins "We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation" [Nihonjin o minzoku to shite doreika sen to shi mata wa kokumin to shite metsubo seshimen to suru no ito o yu suru mono ni arazaru].

The terms used in the Japanese translation of the Potsdam declaration are echoed in the "waga minzoku no metsubo" (destruction of our race) phrasing in the Imperial Rescript issued on 14 August 1945 accepting the demand for unconditional surrender (see full transcription and translation under "Imperial Family" in "Nationalism" section).

The standard English translation has "obliteration of the Japanese nation" instead of "destruction of our race".

Note, however, that the standard Japanese version of the Potsdam declaration renders "nation" as "kokumin" (国民) -- which is used used in the postwar constitution to mean the sovereign "people" of Japan, in place of "shinmin" (臣民), which was used in the Meiji constitution to mean the "loyal people" or "subjects" of the sovereign emperor.

Note also that the word "race" -- i.e., "racioethnic nation" (民族) does not appear in the Instrument of Surrender signed aboard the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63) in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. Nor is the word found in the 1952 San Francisco or Taipei peace treaties, or in the 1965 normalization treaty with ROK -- for the simple and good reason that there was no legal cause for its use in such documents.

1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty

The San Francisco Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed by 48 states in addition to Japan: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Republic of the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Viet-Nam.

1952 Taipei Peace Treaty

The Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China was signed by the foreign ministers of both the Republic of China and Japan in Taipei on 28 April 1952.

The Taipei treaty is very short in comparison with the San Francisco treaty. Article 2 reiterates the provisions in the San Francisco treaty concerning territory related to the Republic of China. Article 4 recognizes that "all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded before 9 December 1941 between Japan and China have become null and void as a consequence of the war."

Article 10 provides that

For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendents who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores).

By consequence of Articles 2, 4, and 10, everyone with family registers in Taiwan and Penghu regardless of where they may be domiciled (including Japan), are ROC nationals.

The Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, signed in Beijin on 29 September 1972 by the foreign ministers of both countries, stipulated that "The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China" (Statement 2). The communique was signed by the heads of state (prime minister and premier), and by the foreign ministers, of both countries.

1965 treaty with ROK

Japan and the Republic of Korea did not sign the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea until 22 June 1965. Signed in Tokyo by the foreign ministers of both countries, this treaty, modeled on the Taipei treaty, is also tied to the San Francisco treaty.

As in the Taipei treaty, the Article 2 of the treaty with ROK similarly confirms that "all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void."

Unlike the Taipei treaty, which does not stipulate that Japan recognize only ROC and not PRC, the agreement with ROK confirms that "the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly."

Language of treaties

Territorial disputes between Japan and Russia, ROK/DPRK, and PRC/ROC involve interpretations of all postwar treaties. The 1952 San Francisco peace treaty was done "in the English, French and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language."

Article 14 of the 1952 Taipei treaty states that "The present Treaty shall be in the Japanese, Chinese and English languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail." The 1965 treaty with ROK was done "in the Japanese, Korean, and English languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail."

28 April 1952

Japan signed a peace treaty with the Allied Powers, excluding the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, on 8 September 1951 in San Francisco. It signed a separate peace treaty with the Republic of China on 28 April 1952 in Taipei. The Taipei treaty came into force on 5 August 1952, the day Japan and ROC exchanged instruments of ratification, also in Taipei.

So 28 April 1952 is the date the terms of the San Francisco treaty came into force, the date the Taipei treaty was signed, and the date the 1952 Alien Restration Law was both promulgated and came into force, abolishing the Alien Registration Order of 1947. In fact, supplementary provisions of the 1952 ARL state that most articles of the law will come into effect as of the first date that the San Francisco treaty begins to operate, meaning 28 April.

Until this point in legal time, all people in Japan with Taiwan and Chosen registers were actually Japanese. Some Japanese agencies regarded such people as aliens from the moment Japan surrendered. This attitude was partly encouraged by SCAP's treatment of people in Japan with Taiwan and Chosen registers as "third nationals" -- meaning nationals of neither allied states (first nationals) nor enemy states (second nationals).

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Terminology

Asakawa Akihiro's research

There are several immigration policy "think tanks" in Japan. The most recent such organization is the Japan Immigration Policy Institute (Nihon Imin Seisaku Kenkyujo) was launched in 2005 by its director (shocho), Sakanaka Hidenori, after his retirement in March that year as director of the Tokyo Immigration Bureau. Sakanaka, born in 1945, joined the Ministry of Justice in 1970 and held a number of posts in the Immigration Bureau during his 35 year career in MOJ.

The administrative director of JIPI is Asakawa Akihiro, who was born as a third-generation Korean in Japan in 1974. Asakawa is a product of Kobe, Osaka, and Nagoya colleges, and is presently an assistant professor at the Graduate School of International Development at Nagoya University. He has studied in Australia and worked for the Japanese Embassy in Australia as a specialist reseacher.

Asakawa specializes in migration and immigration policy, and in Australian politics and society. Much of his research has centered on Koreans in Japan and naturalization.

Asakawa is the author of the following highly recommended book.

Asakawa Akihiro
Zainichi gaikokujin to kika seido
[Japan-resdent aliens and the naturalization system]
Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2003
202 pages

This compact book is the most recent of several volumes that have appeared over the past few decades, on the topic of naturalization in Japan. Its contents are as follows.

Chapter 1   Overview of postwar naturalizers
An analysis of postwar Kanpo notices of permits to naturalize. Highlights trends and traits of naturalizers as seen in official statistics, and examines the system of publishing notices of permits to naturalize in Kanpo and the content of the notices.

Chapter 2   Case study of naturalization
Examines the naturalization system in light of the experiences of a family of Japan-resdident ROK Koreans whose members naturalized.

Chapter 3   Survey of naturalizers
Reports the results of a survey of the circumstances of circumstances, experiences, and attitudes of naturalizers.

Final Chapter   Proposal
Puts forth ideas about future approaches to Japanese nationality

More recently Asakawa has published the following breakdown of Kanpo naturalization permit notices for 2004.

Asakawa Akihiro
"2004 nen no kika-kyoka-sha no gaiyo"
[Overview of persons permitted to naturalize in 2004]
Gaikokujin Seisaku Kenkyujo
[Japan Immigration Policy Institute (JIPI)]
28 October 2005
Gaikokujin Seisaku Chosa Repooto 1
[JIPI Survey Report 1]

The report includes a total breakdown of naturalizers by age and prefecture, based on notices published in Kanpo. Asakawa observes that the 16,295 notices he found in Kanpo are 41 short of 16,366 individuals that the Ministry of Justice elsewhere claims to have permitted to naturalize in 2004. He does not know if the difference is due to compiliation errors on his part, or to a gap between MOJ's statistics and notices in Kanpo. I have talked about this problem elsewhere regarding Kim Yong Dul's 1980 study of naturalization of Koreans in Japan.

Apparently Asakawa was unable to classify one of his own data sets, for his tables tally only 16,294 and not 16,295. These 16,294 persons ranged in age from 0 to 86. Asakawa broke the entire sample down into single ages, then tallied this data into 10-year age groups as follows (from Asakawa's summary).

Age      Persons    Percent

 0-9      1,159      7.1
10-19     2,077     12.7
20-29     3,488     21.4
30-39     4,276     26.2
40-49     2,861     17.6
50-59     1,527      9.4
60+         906      5.6

Total    16,294    100.0

Asakawa noted that, since one must be 20 or older to apply for naturalization, nearly 20 percent of those who were permitted to acquire Japanese nationality in 2004 were children of adult applicants. In other words, a lot of people were naturalized as families.

Asakawa broke the addresses in the Kanpo notices down by prefecture, in order of high to low frequency. All 47 prefectures are listed. The highest and lowest five were as follows (my summary and percents based on Asakawa's data).

Prefecture    Persons    Percent

Osaka         3,209      
Tokyo         2,361
Hyogo         1,485
Aichi         1,170
Kanagawa      1,153
Kyoto         1,142
Fukuoka         598
Saitama         595

[31 other prefectures omitted]  

Kumamoto         33
Kagoshima        30
Aomori           26
Tokushima        25
Shimane          22
Tottori          18
Kochi            15
Saga             14

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Table 1: Naturalization in Japan, 1952-2013

The demographics of interest in becoming Japanese

The following table shows annual counts of aliens who (1) permitted to naturalize by nationality -- Korean (韓国・朝鮮 Kankoku·Chōsen), Chinese (中国 Chūgoku) including Taiwan (台湾 Taiwan), and Others (その他 Sono ta) and (2) not permitted to naturalize, and (3) allowed to apply. It also shows the numbers of Japanese who renounced or lost their nationality.

The rates of unpermitted naturalizations at best estimates.

The figures for renunciation and lost nationality are incomplete, and the manner in which they were compiled is not clear.

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Copyright © by William Wetherall
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